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PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
Shareholder Liability in Ohio: Confounding Attorneys and Others
South High Development Limited v.
Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., L.P.A.
4 Ohio St. 3d 1, __ N.E. 2d - (1983)
I. INTRODUCTION
T HE LATEST CHAPTER in the unusual history of professional corporations was
written recently by the Ohio Supreme Court in South High Develop-
ment Limited v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley Co., L.P.A. I The rationale of South
High Development has laid the foundation for an argument that the usual limita-
tions on corporate shareholder liability, provided by article XIII, section 3 of
the Ohio Constitution, are inapplicable to professional corporations. The holding
of South High Development has jeopardized the corporate status for tax pur-
poses of existing legal professional associations2 (L.P.A.) and may have brought
to an end the short-lived but vigorous growth of that form of law practice in
Ohio. Although these results may not have been intended, they are consequences
which flow naturally from the court's opinion.
The purpose of this article is to explore the soundness and ramifications
of South High Development. To begin, the case holding will be summarized
and the history of professional corporations reviewed. Special emphasis will
be placed on Ohio legal professional corporations. A critique of the court's
rationale and analysis of its implications will then follow.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING OF SOUTH HIGH DEVELOPMENT
South High Development arose when an L.P.A., consisting of three
attorney shareholders, breached a lease on office space. The lessor, South High
Development Limited, instituted suit to recover for the breach naming both
the L.P.A. and the individual attorneys/shareholders as defendants.' The court
of common pleas dismissed the individual defendants on the theory that the
corporate form afforded them limited liability in their shareholder capacities.
It later entered judgment against the L.P.A. This result was affirmed in the
14 Ohio St. 3d 1, __ N.E.2d - (1983).
'rhe legal attributes of a L.P.A. are in most respects identical to those of a typical corporation. Consequently,
the terms "association" and "corporation" are used interchangeably throughout this article.
34 Ohio St. 3d at 2, __ N.E.2d 
__.
'Id.
(143]
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court of appeals.'
Unsatisfied with a judgment solely against the L.P.A., plaintiff continued
its appeal. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the individual attorneys/share-
holders on the theory that Gov. R. III, section 46 created individual liability
for the corporate debt. Ultimately, the supreme court concurred with plain-
tiff's theory and held in its favor. This result involved three independent
holdings. First, the court held that a distinction exists between "private" and
"professional" corporations which places the latter group beyond the constitu-
tional protection provided shareholders by Ohio Constitution article XIII, section
3.' By drawing this distinction, the court defeated defendants' argument that
limited liability is constitutionally mandated. Next, the court held that Gov.
R. III, section 4, promulgated under authority of Ohio Constitution article
IV, section 5(B)8 , supersedes section 1785.04 of the Ohio Revised Code' to the
extent of inconsistency with the Rule. Section 1785.04 purports to preserve within
professional corporations the legal relationships commonly found in non-
professional corporations. With this second holding the court eliminated the
only other positive law in defendants' favor. In opposition to such a holding
and in an attempt to disarm Gov. R. III, section 4, defendants argued that
the court's rule-making power is limited, under Ohio Constitution article IV,
section 5(B),1° to matters of procedure; matters of substantive law are exclud-
ed. In response, the court finally held, in effect, that the constitutional limita-
tion is applicable only to promulgation of procedural rules, not to promulga-
tion of rules aimed at administering the court's inherent" and statutory'
2 power
over the practice of law.
III. THE HISTORY OF PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS
Before examining the soundness of the South High Development decision,
it is helpful to trace the brief history of professional corporations. Statutes
'South High Development, Ltd., v. Weiner, Lippe & Cromley, No. 8lAP-810 (Ohio App. March 9, 1982).
'Gov. R. III, § 4 provides: "The participation by an individual as a shareholder of a legal professional
association shall be on condition that such individual shall, and by such participation does, guarantee
the financial responsibility of the association for its breach of any duty, whether or not arising from the
attorney-client relationship."
'OHIO CONsT. art. XIII, § 3 provides: "Dues from private corporations shall be secured by such means
as may be prescribed by law, but in no case shall any stockholder be individually liable otherwise than
for the unpaid stock owned by him or her ......
'OHIO CONST. art IV, § 5(B) provides in part: "The supreme court . . . shall make rules governing the
admission to the practice of law and discipline of persons so admitted."
'OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.04 (Page 1978) states: "Sections 1785.01 to 1785.08, inclusive, of the Revised
Code, do not modify any law applicable to the relationship between a person furnishing professional service
and a person receiving such service, including liability arising out of such professional service."
'"OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) provides in part: "The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice
and procedure in all courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive
right."
"See Judd v. City Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937).
"OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 4705.01 (Page 1977) states in part: "No person shall be permitted to practice
as an attorney ... unless he has been admitted to the bar by order of the supreme court in compliance
with its prescribed and published rules."
[Vol. 17:1
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authorizing professional corporations, most of which were enacted in the early
1960's,' were passed primarily to allow professionals access to otherwise
unavailable tax advantages." Under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
qualified pension and profit-sharing plans provided tax benefits to corpora-
tions which were unavailable to other forms of business.'" The tax benefits
of these plans included deductibility of employer contributions, 6 non-taxability
of interest earned on the plan investments,' 7 and deferral of employee taxa-
tion until actual distribution'" at which time the employee was likely to be in
a lower tax bracket. Professionals grew envious in the late 1940's of small
business operators who could incorporate and reap these benefits.
After years of failing'9 to obtain comparable tax benefits via non-corporate
plans, some professionals, prior to passage of professional corporation statutes,
attempted to bring their organizations within the Internal Revenue Code's defini-
tion of "corporation," which includes "associations. '" 20 Morrissey v.
Commissioner' and its progeny" had established in the late 1930's that organiza-
tions having a preponderance of corporate attributes - continuity of life, cen-
tralized management, free transferability of interest and limited liability - were
"associations," and thus corporations for tax purposes. Professionals began
organizing their businesses through mutual agreements or charters in such a
way as to exhibit a preponderance of these corporate attributes.
In 1954, the corporate status of one such organization was challenged by
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in United States v. Kintner.23 In Kintner,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held a group of physicians to be an associa-
tion, thus a corporation for tax purposes, despite the Commissioner's insistence
that the state common law prohibition against incorporation by physicians con-
trolled. In 1960, the Internal Revenue Service issued opposing regulations" which
agreed with Kintner that the four-point Morrissey "corporate resemblance"
test was applicable for determining the federal tax status, but looked to state
law as the benchmark for evaluating the four corporate attributes. Under these
"Kintner regulations," the character of the attributes identified by Morrissey
were to be evaluated under state law rather than solely by the terms of the
"117 B. EATON, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS § 9.01 (1982).
"In the absence of authorizing legislation, professionals were generally prohibited from incorporating.
See e.g., State ex rel. Bricker v. Buhl, 131 Ohio St. 217, 2 N.E.2d 601 (1936).
'Smith, Professional Corporations in Ohio: The Time for Statutory Revision, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 439, 441
(1969).
"1.R.C. § 404(a) (1954).
"I.R.C. § 501(a) (1954).
lI.R.C. § 402(a)(1) (1954).
'B. EATON, supra note 13 at § 5.06 (1982).
"I.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1954).
"1296 U.S. 344 (1935).
"See e.g., Bert v. Helvering, 92 F.2d 491 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
"216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954).
2"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1 (1960).
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professional organization's charter or partnership agreement. Corporate status
was met only if a preponderance of the attributes resembled those of a typical
corporation. Because the common law of most states banned incorporation
by professionals the continuity of life, free transferability of interest and limited
liability required to achieve corporate status under the Kintner regulations were
difficult, if not impossible, to attain.
Through the Kintner regulations, however, the Internal Revenue Service
placed control over the federal tax status of professional organizations in the
hands of state legislators. Within approximately two years of their issuance,
fifteen states, including Ohio, enacted legislation authorizing most professionals
to incorporate.25 These legislative enactments purported to confer sufficient
corporate attributes upon the professional corporation, including, in most states,
limited liability,16 to satisfy the Kintner regulations. However, the Internal
Revenue Service again responded in 1965 with regulations27 aimed specifically
at professional service corporations which imposed standards of "corporateness"
considered impossible to satisfy.28
Beginning in 1969 with Empey v. United States29 these particular regula-
tions were repeatedly invalidated by federal courts for unreasonableness" or
inaccuracy of interpretation of the underlying statute.' Some of these cases, 2
after holding the professional service firm regulations void, went on to hold
that the Kintner regulations contained the appropriate test to be applied to all
would-be corporations. Others" rejected the Kintner regulations and the underly-
ing Morrissey case and adopted a "state label" standard by which corporate
status for tax purposes is defined solely by the entity's label as conferred by
state law."
During this controversial period, the Internal Revenue Service Chief
Counsel expressed concern that some professional corporation statutes did not
go far enough, particularly on free transferability of interest and limited liability,
to safely establish corporate resemblance even under the more liberal Kintner
regulations.35 Yet in 1970 the Service acquiesced and conceded that groups of
2'See Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HAv. L. REV. 776, 780 (1962).
"Id. at 780.
27Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1965).
"See Smith, supra note 15, at 342.
2-406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969).
"See e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969).
"See e.g., Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969).
"See e.g., Id.; Holder v. United States, 412 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1969).
"See e.g., O'Neill v. United States, 410 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); Empey v. United States, 406 F2d 157
(10th Cir. 1969).
"This holding was reached by a fresh construction of 1.R.C. § 7701(a)(3) (1965) after a finding that Morrissey
was not controlling on the definition of corporateness since that case involved a trust, not a corporation.
"Worthy, IRS Chief Counsel Outlines What Lies A head for Professional Corporations, 32 J. TAX'N 88
(1970).
[Vol. 17:1
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professionals organized under most state professional corporation laws would
generally be treated as corporations for tax purposes." At that time the Ser-
vice dropped its appeal in Empey and similar cases which involved the profes-
sional service firm regulations." Later remarks by the Chief Counsel revealed
that this concession represented an agreement that the special professional service
corporation regulations were invalid but did not represent agreement that the
"state label" would suffice in the event an organization failed to exhibit a
preponderance of corporate attributes.3" By its acquiescence in the holdings
of Empey, O'Neill, Kurzner v. United States39 and Holder v. United States,0
the Service prevented the Supreme Court from determining the appropriate
standards of corporateness for tax purposes."' The present regulations still utilize
the Kintner corporate resemblance standard with reference to state law for def'm-
ing the legal attributes of the organization. 2
IV. PROFESSIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW IN OHIO
As noted above,"3 the acquisition of tax advantages was the primary pur-
pose behind enactment of professional corporation statutes in most states, in-
cluding Ohio. In a sense, the potential advantages of limited liability, free
transferability of interest, continuity of life and centralized management could
be viewed as incidental windfalls. Often essential to desired tax treatment under
the Kintner regulations, these windfalls and their potential impact on the legal
profession were a source of consternation for the legal community.4"
The American Bar Association Committee on Professional Ethics addressed
"Rev. Rul. 70-101.
"Rev. Rul. 70-101 states in part:
The Government has not applied for certiorari in the cases of United States v. O'Neill, 410 F.2d
888 (6th Cir. 1969); Kurzner v. United States, 413 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1969); Empey v. United States,
406 F.2d 157 (10th Cir. 1969); and Holder v. United States, 289 F. Supp. 160 (N.D. Ga. 1968),
affirmed, per curiam, 412 F.2d 1189 (5th Cir. 1969).
""I believe it is appropriate to tell you that while we accept the conclusions of the courts that the 1965
regulations are invalid, we do not accept the suggestion of some of the court opinions that a state label
will suffice to make an organization a corporation for tax purposes even if it posseses none of the traditional
corporate characteristics. Certainly such a conclusion should not be read into our announcement of
concession last August." Worthy, "Professional Corporations" Remarks delivered before the National
Conference of Bar Presidents, St. Louis, Mo. (Aug. 7, 1970), reprinted in part in B. EEATON, supra note
13, § 31.03 note 29.
"9413 F.2d at 97.
'289 F. Supp. at 160.
"One commentator points out that the appropriate standard for corporateness remains unidentified, thus
creating the opportunity for further litigation in the event that some change of circumstance provides an
impetus. B. EATON, supra note 13, at § 13.01. South High Development may provide that impetus. This
is especially so since the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in O'Neill adopted the state label theory which
directly contradicts the Kintner Regulations as they appear in present day Treas. Reg. § 301.7701.
"1Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1983).
"See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
""From ... briefs it is obvious that so far as members of the bar are concerned the idea of the practice
of law within a corporate structure is an emotional thing. It is much like cats, olives and Roosevelt; it
is either enthusiastically embraced or resolutely rejected." State ex Rel. Green v. Brown, 173 Ohio St.
114, 115, 180 N.E.2d 157, 158 (1962).
Summer, 19831 RECENT CASES
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these concerns in Formal Opinion 303"1 which was issued in the same year that
the Ohio Professional Corporation Statutes were enacted. Whether by design
or accident, the Ohio law as enacted, including its apparent limitations on
liability,"' appears to conform to the ethical requirements listed in that Opinion:
(1) The lawyer rendering the legal services to the client must be personally
responsible to the client; 7 (2) Restrictions on liability as to other lawyers
in the organization must be made apparent to the client;"' (3) None of
the stockholders may be non-lawyers, 9 or if stock falls into the hands
of laymen, provisions must be made for transfer back to lawyers; (4) There
must be no profit-sharing plans including employees who are non-lawyers;50
and (5) No layman may be permitted to participate in the management
of the firm.5
Yet the legal status of L.P.A.'s in Ohio remained uncertain following the passage
of the professional corporation statutes until reviewed by the supreme court.
That court's opinion was first heard in 1962 in State Ex Rel. Green v.
Brown,52 after an attorney named Green attempted to file articles of incor-
poration with the Secretary of State. When the filing was refused, Green sought
a writ of mandamus which the supreme court denied. The court held that the
power to admit a corporation to the practice of law was an exclusive function
of the judiciary. Because the court had not granted such authorization, Green
was not entitled to practice law in a corporate form."
Eight years later, in 1970, the court consented to a request by the bar that
it be afforded the same tax benefits of incorporation being enjoyed by their
fellow professionals5" by promulgating Rule XVII(B).55 In granting authoriza-
tion for attorneys to practice in a corporate form, the supreme court imposed
a condition which is at the heart of the South High Development decision: "The
participation of an individual as a shareholder of a legal professional associa-
"ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Op. 303 (1961).
"OHIO'REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.04 (Page 1978). See supra note 9.
"See Id.
"See Gov. R. III, § 2 requiring that "[An incorporated law firm] name shall end with the legend, 'Co.,
L.P.A.' or shall have immediately below it, in clearly legible form, the words 'A Legal Professional
Association'."
"OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1785.07 (Page 1978) provides: "A shareholder of a professional association may
sell or transfer his shares . . . only to another individual who is duly licensed ...to render the same
professional service as that for which the corporation was organized."
"MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-102(A) (1979) provides: "A lawyer or law firm shall
not share legal fees with a non-lawyer ...."
"MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 3-103(A) (1979) provides: "A lawyer shall not form
a partnership with a non-lawyer if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the practice of law."
"173 Ohio St. 114, 180 N.E.2d 157 (1962).
"Id. at 115, 180 N.E.2d at 158.
"Incorporation among physicians was gaining popularity as evidenced by O'Neill v. United States, 410
F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1969).
"SUP. CT. R. PRAc. XVII(B); later to become Gov. R. III.
[Vol. 17:1AKRON LAW REVIEW
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tion shall be on the condition that such individual shall, and by such participation
does, guaranty the financial responsibility of the association for its breach of
any duty, whether or not arising from the attorney-client relationship." Prior
to South High Development, at least one Ohio law commentator56 had con-
strued this Rule to alter the limited liability apparently provided to attor-
neys/shareholders through application of section 1785.04 of the Ohio Revised
Code and article XIII, section 3, of the Ohio Constitution. Yet many people
affected by the Rule, apparently including the defendants in South High
Development, believed the limited liability acknowledged to exist with respect
to corporations comprised of physicians57 to be the rule for all professional
corporations. Presumably those who held such a view would have considered
Gov. R. III, section 4 solely a disciplinary provision.5"
V. CRITIQUE AND ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH HIGH DEVELOPMENT RATIONALE
Though the South High Development opinion occupies only four pages
of text, the court's reasoning is sufficiently complex to have justified much
more explanation. To arrive at its ultimate conclusion, the South High Develop-
ment court was required to overcome three difficult obstacles. First, the court
was faced with article XIII, section 3, of the Ohio Constitution, which pro-
vides limited liability to corporate shareholders. Second, the court was con-
fronted with the allegation that Gov. R. III, section 4, modifies substantive
law and is therefore beyond the scope of the court's power under the
constitution.59 Third, the court's rationale necessitated an implicit claim of
supremacy over the legislature in all facets of control over conduct of law prac-
titioners both private and corporate - a position in conflict with the established
view that the judiciary regulates admission and discipline of the bar while the
legislature controls matters of corporate law.6"
A. The Court's Treatment of Ohio Constitution article XIII, section 3
Providing Limited Shareholder Liability
To avoid the plain language of the constitutional limitation on shareholder
liability, the court identified two factors distinguishing "private" corporations
from "professional" corporations, then proceeded to hold article XIII, sec-
tion 3 of the Ohio Constitution inapplicable to the latter group. The first of
67 CAVITCH, OHIO CORPORATION LAW, § 18.23 (1982).
"See e.g., Lenhart v. Toledo Urology Associates, Inc., 48 Ohio App. 2d 249, 356 N.E.2d 749 (1975) which
held that a professional corporation comprised of physicians has the same general liability features as
a general corporation.
"Such was the view held by J. Whiteside's concurring opinion in South High Development, No. 81AP-810
(Ohio App. March 9, 1982) at 505:
With the understanding that neither unconstitutionality nor invalidity of Section 4 of Gov. R. III
is suggested or determined hereby, I concur in the judgment. Gov. R. III does not purport to
determine liability of shareholders of a legal professional association to third persons but, rather,
regulates the conduct of attorneys in their capacity as shareholders of a legal professional association.
"OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B). See supra note 8.
"See Note, The New Ohio Professional Associations Act and the Preclusion of Corporations from the
Practice of Law, 24 OHIo ST. L.J. 685, 687 (1963). See also infra note 78.
Summer, 19831 RECENT CASES
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the factors identified was a difference in corporate activity or purpose.6" The
court stated that a professional corporation is organized to carry out a profes-
sion while a private corporation's sole purpose is to accumulate capital for return
on shareholder investment. Based on this distinction the court concluded that
it is reasonable to find that the constitutional protection afforded shareholders
applies only to the private corporation. The second distinction offered by the
court was the level of shareholder involvement in the corporation. 6 The court
noted that most professional corporations employ their shareholders whereas
most private corporations do not. Consequently, the court concluded, only
shareholders of private corporations need be insulated from corporate debt
over which they have no participation or control as members of management.
Little thought is required to identify serious flaws in the court's reason-
ing. First, in attempting to establish a dichotomy between carrying out a pro-
fession and profit-making the court has drawn a false comparison since these
activities need not be mutually exclusive. Most professionals do seek to profit
from their efforts. It is not clear in the court's opinion why professionals should
be less entitled to the constitutional protection than other profit-makers. The
second distinction, relating to shareholder involvement, is slightly less
troublesome but remains far from persuasive. It seems reasonable that
shareholders closely associated with the corporate affairs ought to bear a greater
responsibility for corporate actions, yet it is unlikely that the court would follow
its own distinction and abrogate shareholder immunity in a closely held cor-
poration. Moreover, the most troubling aspect of the court's rationale on this
point is the scope of the distinctions drawn. It is doubtful that the court intended
to abrogate shareholder immunity in all professional corporations, yet the
distinguishing factors offered as reasons for evading the constitution carry a
much broader application than to only legal professional associations. While
valid reasons may exist for removing L.P.A.'s from the protection of the con-
stitutional provision, the court's failure to accurately state such reasons injects
uncertainty and confusion into the issue of professional corporate shareholder
liability.
B. Treatment of Ohio Constitutional article IV, section 5 Limiting
Judicial Rule-Making Power to "Procedural" Matters
The second obstacle which the court's rationale was forced to overcome
was the claim by defendants that Gov. R. III, section 4, to the extent that it
created shareholder liability for debts of the L.P.A., was a violation of the
limitation on the court's judicial power under Ohio Constitution article IV,
section 5 because the Rule modified a "substantive" right.63 The distinction
6'4 Ohio St. 3d at 3, - N.E.2d 
__.
621d.
6Id. at 4.
[Vol. 17:1
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between substantive and procedural rights is quite nebulous" and recent court
history has developed an expansive definition of "substantive," which in effect
has narrowed the court's power of rule-making. 5 Nonetheless, the South High
Development court summarily dismissed the above argument, stating: "[Gov.
R. III] is not one of procedure, but one relating to the control of the practice
of the profession of law." 66 The court further noted its inherent 7 and statutory68
authority to regulate admission to the practice of law in Ohio, quoting from
Ohio Constitution article IV section 5(B) which states in part: "The supreme
court... shall make rules governing the admission to the practice of law and
discipline of persons so admitted."
Despite the correctness of the court's claim to exclusive authority over
admission to the practice of law, such a claim is not responsive to the argu-
ment that Gov. R. III, section 4 abridges a substantive right. Presumably the
scope of the court's power over members of the bar would allow the court
to define standards for admission to the bar, to discipline attorneys for con-
duct unbefitting the profession and, ultimately, to disbar an attorney. The court's
power over attorneys in this regard exists only as an outgrowth of the attorneys'
presence in the judicial system. The individual attorney could nullify the court's
disciplinary power over himself or herself simply by leaving the legal profession.
In contrast, Gov. R. III, section 4 as applied by the court alters legal rela-
tionships between individual attorneys and third persons with whom the at-
torneys commercially deal through the L.P.A. The Rule creates a liability to
third persons in the corporate context where they did not exist in the absence
of the Rule.' 9 It is thus difficult to understand the court's claim that Gov. R.
III, section 4 does not abridge, enlarge or modify a substantive right and does
not violate Ohio Constitution article IV, section 5. It is equally difficult to
understand how the court could have viewed its assertion of inherent authority
over admission and discipline of the bar as an argument responsive to the defen-
dants' claim.
"See Note, Substance and Procedure: The Scope of Judicial Rule Making Authority in Ohio, 37 OHIo
ST. L.J. 364, 366 (1976): "It has been contended that such nebulous concepts as 'substance' and
'procedure' result in an illusory distinction and that the terms should be abandoned."
"Id. at 378.
"4 Ohio St. 3d at 4, - N.E.2d.
"'See Judd v. City Trust & Savings Bank, 133 Ohio St. 81, 12 N.E.2d 288 (1937).
"OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4705.1 (Page 1977). See supra note 12.
"See Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132, 144, 285 N.E.2d 736, 744 (1972) in which the court, holding
a rule of procedure unconstitutional for affecting a substantive right, stated: "If a defense of lack of
consent by the General Assembly to suits against the state was available as a right of or defense to the
state before the adoption of the new Rules of Civil Procedure, and if such right or defense was a substantive
right of the state, then it must remain available to the state after the adoption of the [Rules] .... (emphasis
added). The court goes on to characterize substantive law as that which "... . both defines and regulates
the rights of the parties." Id. at 145, 285 N.E.2d at 144. Application of this reasoning to Gov. R. III,§ 4 leads to the conclusion that it is unconstitutional as construed by the court in South High Development.
Summer, 1983] RECENT CASES
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C. The Distinction Between Judicial and Legislative Control Over L.P.A. 's
The third troublesome aspect of the court's rationale is closely linked with
the first two. In its effort to impose liability through application of Gov. R.
III, section 4, the court was faced with the need to assert the supremacy of
that Rule over the particular substantive statute with which it potentially con-
flicts - Ohio Revised Code section 1785.04. This section, which preserves for
professional corporations the legal structure found in general corporations, could
be construed to provide shareholder immunity.7" The court reasoned, however,
that since Gov. R. III was promulgated under its constitutional authority over
the conduct of the bar,7' the Rule supersedes the statute to the extent of
inconsistency.
This claim of supremacy of the statute closely resembles the court's defense
of the Rule as non-substantive. In fact, the issues are not clearly distinguished
in the opinion. Nonetheless, the issue is distinct and involves reference to a
separate constitutional provision as authority to override the Code. Mysteriously,
the Code is overridden by a Rule defended as non-substantive elsewhere in the
opinion.
As with the substantive/procedural holding, the court failed on this issue
to distinguish between its power to regulate admissions to and conduct of the
bar and the legislature's power to regulate substantive corporate law. 72 This
approach fails to recognize that the existence of L.P.A.'s requires two bodies
to act - the legislature to authorize the formation of corporate entities for
the purpose of practicing a profession, and the judiciary to admit such cor-
porations to the practice of law.
73
D. Liability Consequences for L.P.A. 's and Other
Professional Corporations
South High Development provides by judicial decree what very few states
have adopted by legislative enactment 7 - unlimited liability for shareholders
of legal professional corporations. While the facts of South High Development
deal only with contractual liability, the language of Gov. R. III, section 4 seems
to incorporate tort liability as well.75 In effect, South High Development treats
the L.P.A. as a partnership for liability purposes. Proponents of this treat-
ment argue that it is necessary in order to preserve a professional relationship
"See e.g., Vesely, The Ohio Professional Association Law, 13 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 195, 203 (1962).
"OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B), supra note 10.
"OHIO CONST. art. XIII, § 2.
"See Note supra note 64, at 687 which states: "Thus the situation is one in which, to permit the practice
of law through a corporate form, two agencies must act: The legislature must permit lawyers, as professional
persons, to incorporate, and the supreme court must permit the corporations thus formed to practice."
'Eaton indicates that 46 states had professional corporation statutes by 1970 and that only five of those
statutes retained joint and several liability. B EATON, supra note 13 at §§ 9.01 and 4.02 [61, note 18.
"See supra note 6.
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between attorneys and their clients. 6 Others, including the ABA Committee
on Professional Ethics in Formal Opinion 303, conclude that unlimited liability
among professional associates is not necessary. Regardless of the view adopted,
it is reasonable to conclude that the South High Development result will pro-
vide better policing of professional responsibility than if the court had ruled
in favor of limiting liability. In this respect the court's decision may aid the
integrity and reputation of the bar. Perhaps the court has reached a good con-
clusion based on incorrect legal reasoning.
As mentioned above, the most troubling aspect of the court's reasoning
is that applied to Ohio Constitution article XIII, section 3. Nothing in the facts
of South High Development or the surrounding opinion suggests that the court
intended to abrogate shareholder immunity for all professional corporations.
Yet the factors offered by the court to distinguish "professional" from "private"
corporations certainly apply to more than just the legal profession. By draw-
ing such a broad distinction, the court has provided future litigants with a solid
basis for naming both the professional corporation and its individual owners
as defendants in suits which involve the liability of either. When eventually
faced with such a case on appeal, the supreme court will have the difficult task
of explaining why shareholders of non-legal professional corporations have a
preferred status.
An added effect of South High Development on the legal profession in
particular is its influence on the decision of whether to practice as a legal pro-
fessional corporation. Until recently, law firms were drawn to the L.P.A. form
of organization by two factors: tax advantages" and limitations on liability
for peer malpractice. Recent changes in the tax laws concerning pension plans
have removed virtually any pension incentive for professionals to incorporate."
At the same time, the maximum individual tax rate was lowered to within a few
percentage points of the maximum corporate rate. 9 Few tax advantages, if
any, remain. In similar fashion, South High Development has eliminated poten-
tial liability benefits to incorporating the law practice. Thus, there appears to
be no incentive in the near future for law firms to incorporate.
E. Potential Effect on "Corporateness" of Present L.P.A. 's
In addition to destroying what incentive remained to form an L.P.A., South
High Development may prove to be the undoing of present L.P.A.'s. As noted
above, some uncertainty over the present and future definition of "corpora-
tion" for tax purposes remains.80 Some commentators feel that a strict "state
"See e.g., Note, supra note 60, at 691. An alternative basis for effectively achieving the same result would
have been to treat Gov. R. III as a disciplinary provision mandating certain levels of financial
responsibility. Cf., supra note 58.
"See supra, notes 16, 17 and 18 and accompanying text.
"Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982).
"I9d.
"See B. EATON, supra notes 13, 41.
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label" definition applies while others feel the corporate resemblance standard
is at the foundation of the tax laws and may re-emerge in the area of profes-
sional corporations if the standard is challenged in court.
South High Development makes Ohio ripe for the challenge. The Sixth
Circuit in O'Neill embraced the "state label" theory while the Internal Revenue
Service's present regulations still apply a corporate resemblance standard. 8'
Assuming, as is reasonable, that some future change in the tax laws will restore
substantial benefits to the corporate form, South High Development will make
Ohio a convenient forum for the Service to resolve the lingering uncertainty.
With limited liability gone for Ohio L.P.A.'s, the corporate resemblance stan-
dard will require for corporate tax treatment that the remaining three
attributes - free transferability of shares, centralized management and con-
tinuity of life - all resemble the corporate form. No doubt the Service could
find an L.P.A. which after South High Development badly fails the corporate
resemblance standard. Upon litigating the "corporateness" of such a firm tie
Service would lose under the Sixth Circuit's "state label" theory, then pro-
ceed to seek certiorari to resolve a conflict in the circuits and enter the Supreme
Court with an unusually strong set of facts, thanks to South High Develop-
ment. If this or any other scenario arises in which the Service renews its challenge
to the corporateness of L.P.A.'s under the present Regulations, some will fail
the test and be forced to amend their present compensation, pension and tax
structures.
V. CONCLUSION
South High Development will bring to an abrupt halt the transition among
law firms from the partnership to the professional corporation form of prac-
tice. Not only does it eliminate limited liability, the final attractive feature of
L.P.A.'s remaining since the elimination of tax advantages, but it also jeopar-
dizes the corporateness for tax purposes of present day L.P.A.'s. Of even greater
significance is South High Development's potential impact on non-legal pro-
fessional corporations. The court's rationale requires the conclusion, probably
unintended, that no shareholder of professional corporations may enjoy the
limited liability universal among non-professional corporations. While the result
of South High Development may well enhance the integrity and image of the
Ohio Bar, the potential tax effect and the liability implications for non-legal
professional corporations, probably unintended by the court, may outweigh
those benefits.
TIMOTHY J. O'HEARN
"Treas. Reg. § 301.7701 (1983).
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